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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Is Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act constitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause
when its effects are consistent with its stated, non-punitive purpose of protecting the
people of the State of Alaska from dangerous sex offenders?

II.

Is Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act constitutional under the Due Process
Clause where the state only publishes true and public information, and there is no
resulting termination of any tangible legal interest?
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Nos. 01-729,01-1231
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FALL TERM 2002

RONALD O. OTTE and BRUCE M. BOTELIIO,
Petitioners,
V.

JOHN DOE l.et.al..
Respondents.

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et. al..
Petitioners,
V.

JOHN DOE, et. al.,
Respondents.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITES STATES COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, Ronald O. Otte, and Bruce M. Botelho, respectfully submit this brief and
request that this court REVERSE the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on Respondents’ ex post facto claim. Petitioner, the Connecticut Department of
Public Safety, respectfully requests that this court REVERSE the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Respondents’ due process claim.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United Stales Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at Doe
1 \ . Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is reported at Doe v. Conn. Dent, of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Cases in the Courts of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after
rendition of judgment or decree. 28 U.S.C.

1254 (West 1993). Final judgment in Doe 1 v. Pile

was entered on April 9, 2001. (J.A. 227.) This Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2002.
(J..A. 229.) Final judgment in Doe v. Conn. Dent. ol Public Safety was entered on May 18, 2001.
(J.A. 72.) This Court granted certiorari on May 20, 2002. (J.A. 108.)
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Tlic Constitutional Pro\ isions relevant to the disposition of this case are U.S. Const, art.
1.

10, and U.S. Const, amend. XIV. The statutory provisions relevant to the disposition of this

case are 42 U.S.C. i; 1983, 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41, Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (Lexis L.
Pubig. 2001), and Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-261 (2001), amended by 2001 Conn. Legis. Serv.
01-84 (West).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pft-liminar\' Statement
1.

Alaska Sex Offender Reiiistration Act: Ex Post Facto Claim

On May 13, 1994, John Doe I. Jane Doe, and John Doe II (hereinafter “Respondents")
nied a complaint under 42 U.S.C.

1983 in the United States District Court for the District of

Alaska. (J.A. 110.) Respondents brought their action against the state commissioner for public
safety and the state attorney general to enjoin enforcement of the Alaska Se.\ Otlcnder
Registration Act (hereinafter “Alaska Statute"), Alaska Stat.

12.63.010. (J.A. 110.)

Respondents alleged that enforcement of the registration and notilication provisions ot the
Alaska Statute N'iolatcd the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. (J.A. 112-13, 119.)
Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the Alaska Statute requirements. (J.A.
no.)

The district court granted a preliminary injunction barring public disclosure of the
Respondents' registration information, but denied their motion to proceed under pseudonyms.
(J.A. 213.) In the original complaint. John Doe I was known as "James Rowe." (J.A. 213.)
When the Alaska Respondents refused to amend their complaint to include their real names, the
district conn dismissed the action. (J.A. 213.) On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals lor
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to
use pseudonyms. (J.A. 213.)
Following remand to the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (J.A. 202-03.) The district court determined that there had been no violation of
Respondents’ rights and granted the state’s motion. (J.A. 204.) On August 13, 1999, the district
court entered judgment against Respondents and dismissed their complaint. (J.A. 204.)
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However, the district court reinstated its preliminary injunction after Respondents filed a notice
of appeal with the Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 194.)
On August 18. 1999. Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. (J.A. 204.) On review, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. (J.A. 222.) The court held that the Alaska Statute’s registration and
notillcation provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United Slates Constitution
because their effects were punitive to such an extent that they overcame the Alaska Statute's
slated. non-punili\e intent and presumption of constitutionality. (J.A. 215, 222.) This Court
granted ceiliorari on February 19,2002. Ottc v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1126(2002).
2.

Connectieut Sex Offender Registration Act: Respondents’ Due Process Claim

On February 22. 1999, John Doe, representing a class of similarly situated sex offender
registrants (hereinafter “Connecticut Respondents"), filed an action with the United States
District Couil for the District of Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (J.A. 3.) Connecticut
Respondents alleged that the provisions of the Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act
(“Connecticut Act”), Conn. Gen. Stat.

54-250-261, violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 45.) Connecticut Respondents sought both declarative and injunctive relief from state
enforcement of the Connecticut Act's provisions. (J.A. 20-21.)
The parlies filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (J.A. 65, 67.) On March 31,
2000, the district court denied in part and granted in part the motions for summary judgment.
(J.A. 69.) Specifically, the court held that the Connecticut Act violated the Due Process Clause
on the grounds that its public notification provisions falsely stigmatized registrants, and its
registration requirement altered their legal status, thereby satisfying the “stigma plus" test for due
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process violation. (J.A. 51.) However, the court held that it did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. (J.A. 52.) The court then granted the Connecticut Respondents* motion for a permanent
injunction. (J.A. 71.)
In May 2001, the parties filed cross-appeals to the United Stales Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. (J.A. 73-75.) On review, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
injunction on due process grounds. (J.A. 81.) The court reasoned that the legislature's public
safety intent behind the law in conjunction with public notification, created a false stigma of
dangerousness. (J.A. 87.) The court further determined that the Connecticut Act’s registration
requirements satisfied the “plus” factor because they alter registrants’ legal status and are
governmental in nature. (J.A. 93.) The Court of Appeals elected not to decide the ex post facto
issue. (J.A. 96.) This Court granted ccniorari on May 20, 2002. Conn, Dept, of Public Safety \ .
Doe. 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002).
Statement of Facts
In 1994, seven-year old Megan Kanka was the victim of a brutal sexual assault and
murder in New Jersey. E.B. v. Vcmiero. 119F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997). The perpetrator
lived across the street from Megan’s home, and had twice been convicted of sex offenses
iin olving young girls, jd. The alanning circumstances of Megan Kanka’s death prompted the
New Jersey legislature to enact a registration and notification law for convicted sex offenders.
Id. Though not the first American jurisdiction to register sex offenders, New Jersey’s
registration and notification law served as a catalyst for numerous other states to enact what have
come to be known as “Megan’s Laws.” Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive
State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws. 89 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1167, 1172 (1999).
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Slionly iherearter, ihc United Stales Congress followed suit and passed the Jacob
Weiteiiing Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program. 42
l.'.S.C. vj 14701 (West 1996). The legislation conditioned the states' receipt of certain federal
funds on local law cnforcemeni implementation of a program to disseminate relevant information
regarding convicted sex offenders released back into the community. Id Now, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have some form of sex offender registration requirements in force.
Logan. 89 j. Crim. L. cV Criminology at 1175. Nineteen slates, including Alaska and
Connecticut. eniplo> a “compulsory approach." whereby offenders satisfying specific statutory.
olTense-related criteria are subject to the registration and notification prox isions. Id.
1.

Alaska Statute: Doe I et. al. v. Otle. Ex Post Facto Claim.

On May 12. 1994, ihc Alaska Legislature enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration
.Act (hereinafter “Alaska Statute"). (J.A. 213.) This legislative decision came on the heels of a
“crisis" situation regarding Alaska's high rate of sexual offense. (J.A. 213.) The legislature
heard testimony that Alaska had the highest rate of child sexual abuse in the nation, and had the
second highest rale of sexual assault. (J.A. 139.) Testimony presented to legislators further
cs idenced an extremely high rale of recidivism for sex offenders. (J.A. 140.) Moreover, in
1993. one hundred convicted sex oflendcrs were scheduled to be released from prison; twice as
many as usual. (J.A. 140.)
Under the Alaska Statute, any person convicted of a sex offense, in any jurisdiction, is
subject to the registration and notification requirements. (J.A. 140-41.) The Alaska statute
requires registrants to submit to photographing and fingerprinting, and to provide certain
personal information. (J.A. 213.) Failure to comply results in criminal penalties. (J.A. 213.)
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The information collected under the registration requirement is made publicly available through
the Department of Public Safety’s central registry website. (J.A. 214.)

John Doe I and John Doe II are con\'icted se.\ offenders subject to the registration and
notification requirements of the Alaska Statute. (J.A. 214.) In 1985, John Doe I had entered a
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor following a court determination
that he had sexually abused his daughter for a period of two years. (J.A. 212.) He was
incarcerated for eight years and released in 1990. (J.A. 212.) In 1984, John Doc II had entered a
plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexually abusing a fourteen-year-old child. (J.A. 213.) He
was sentenced to eight years in prison, and was also released in 1990. (J.A. 213.)
2.

Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act: Doe v. Conn. Dept, of Pub. Safety.
Due Process Claim.

Under Connecticut’s version of “Megan’s Law,’’ persons convicted of certain enumerated
sex offenses are required to register with the Commissioner of Public Safety upon their release
into the community. Conn. Gen. Stat.

54-250-261 (2001). All registrants must provide

certain information, including: name, address, place of employment, criminal convictions, and a
photograph. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251-254 (2001). Registrants are required to notify the
Commissioner upon change of address, and submit to being photographed at least every live
years. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251-254. Failure to comply constitutes a felony offense. Conn.
Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-254 (2001). The gathered information is then made public via a central
registry', which is required to be accessible over the Internet. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)(l)
(2001).

The registration requirements vary depending on the type of sex offense committed.
(J.A. 27.) Also, certain classes of offenders may be completely exempted from registration
obligations if a court finds that registration is not necessary for public safety. Conn. Gen Stat.
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54-25 l{b)-(c) (2001). A court may enter an order restricting the dissemination of registry
information if it finds that public safety does not require disclosure. Conn. Gen Stat. § 54251 (b)-(c). Depending on the underlying offense, certain registrants may petition for such an
order. Conn. Gen. Stat § 54-255(c) (2001). Further, the Connecticut Department of Public
Safely has a procedure in place to respond to challenges regarding the authenticity of registr\'
data. (J.A. 30.) An individualized assessment of se.\ otlenders' public safety threat is not made
in determining whether registration is required. (J.A. 30.) Rather, the sentencing court
determines whether the felony committed was for a sexual purpose, and thus, whether sex
offender registration is necessar)'. (J.A. 82.) The website includes a disclaimer notifying
\ icwers that no indi\'idualizcd assessment of a particular registrant s dangerousness has been
made, and that it is a crime to use the regisir>’ information for purposes of harassment. (J.A. 31.)
John Doe is a eom icted sex offender subject to the registration and notification
requirements of the Connecticut Act. (J.A. 3.) He represents a class of plaintifts who allege the
Act creates a constitutional deprivation of due process rights. (J.A. 4-5.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hoth the Alaska and Connecticut statutes are constitutional. They do not violate
Respondents' rights and should be upheld by this Court.
The Alaska Statute is constitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Alaska
Le^dslature enacted the Alaska Statute with the sole and express intent of protecting its citizens.
The registration and notification requirements are not so onerous or punitive that they rise to the
level of “clearest proof’ required to negate the legislature’s intent. The Ninth Circuit correctly
concluded that three of the seven factors it considered in analyzing the effects of the Alaska
Statute did not point to any punitive effect. The Ninth Circuit wrongly decided that any of the
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remaining four factors were sufficient to overcome the combined weight of the first three factors
and the presumption of constitutionality drawn from the Alaska Statute's stated intent. The
registration and notification requirements do not impose any affirmative disability or restraint
triggered by criminal behavior on Respondents because they can travel freely and live wherever
they choose. Furthermore, the Alaska Statute does not impose requirements that are historically
regarded as punishment because the distribution of public information is not punishment. The
Alaska Statute docs not promote the traditional punitix e aim of retribution because it does not
affix culpability to prior conduct or punish past misdeeds. The Alaska Statute does not activate
solely on a finding of scienter as it imposes its requirements on all convicted sex ofTenders,
regardless ot mental state. The Alaska Statute does not impose excessive costs in relation to its
stated purpose of public safety because potential domestic and international audiences receiving
any Alaska Statute information posted on the Internet are self-limiting, and diminish as their
distance from Alaska increases.
As a matter of public policy, upholding the constitutionality of the Alaska Statute furthers
the important societal goal of protecting the public from dangerous sex offenders, and allows a
uniquely situated state to provide information to its widely-dispersed population.
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act docs not violate the due process guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court’s past decisions have clearly delineated the scope of
this protection with respect to the interest contained in an individual’s reputation, and procedural
guarantees do not apply to the case at bar. This Court has enunciated the “stigma plus” lest to
determine if a liberty interest in reputation exists and is desen-'ing of constitutional protection.
The test demands that Respondents demonstrate that (1) the state’s actions falsely stigmatized
them, and (2) that “as a result of the state action complained of, a right or status previously
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recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished.” Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 711
(1976). Respondents' claim fails both parts of this test.
Respondents were not falsely stigmatized by Connecticut's publication of its sex offender
registry information. It is uncontested that Respondents are convicted sex offenders and that all
the information contained in the published registr>' is true. There is no defamation when the state
disseminates true information arising from public criminal proceedings. All injur>' to
Respondents' reputations How s directl\' from their own criminal misconduct.
In addition, there is no defamator\’ implication made by the publication of the registry'.
Connecticut's notification provisions apply equally to all registrants on the basis of their
conviction. There is no dissemination of any information regarding an individual registrant's
Ie\ el of dangerousness. The website's disclaimer expressly negates any such false inferences.
The Second Circuit also wrongly concluded that sex offender registration requirements
satisfy the “plus" factor, because they arc uniquely go\'cmmental in nature. This is an incorrect
interpretation and expansion of the holding in Paul. Under Paul, the terminated right must be a
result of the act complained of: here, that is the notification provision. Registration is a merely a
regulatory measure collateral to the criminal conviction. Neither provisions satisfy this Court’s
del'mition of the “plus” factor.
Accordingly, Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to REVERSE the decisions of the
Second and Ninth Circuits.
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ARGUMENT
I.

ALASKA’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE ITS EFFECTS ARE CONSISTENT
WITH ITS STATED NON-PUNITIVE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THE PEOPLE OF
ALASKA FROM DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS.
The United States Constitution dictates that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any ... ex post

facto law.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10. An ex post facto law is one that "aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. . . . changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." Caldcr v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386.
300 (1798). Nearly one hundred years after the decision in Calder. this Court clarified its
language, stating more simply that legislatures "may not retroactively alter the definition of
crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43
(1990). In Collins, the Court set a high standard for Finding an ex post facto violation, holding
that there could be none where a law merely altered a situation to a party's disadvantage, even if
the disadvantage involved the deprivation of a substantial right. 497 U.S. at 47 (overruling Knng
V.

Mo.. 107 U.S. 21 (1883) and Thompson v. Utah. 170 U.S. 343 (1898)).
The current test for determining whether a statute retroactively increases the punishment

for a crime in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause operates in two stages. U.S. v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242. 248 (1980). The first phase of inquiry examines the legislative history of a statute to
determine if the legislature either expressly or impliedly indicated a regulatory or punitive intent.
If a court determines that the intent behind a statute was punitive, ex post facto analysis ends
and the statute is invalidated. See id.; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 169(1963).
If the legislative intent behind a statute is non-punitive, or even ambiguous, the statute survives
the crucial first phase of ex post facto inquiry and moves to the next. S^ Ward. 448 U.S. at 24849; Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 169 (stating that an ex post facto inquiry only ends at this
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early stage when there is “conclusi\ e e\ idence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a
statute.”). The second phase of ex post facto inquiry seeks to determine whether, even in the
presence of a stated non-puniti\ c intention, a statute is “so punitive in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention.” \V^, 448 U.S. at 249. The second stage of inquiry is a difficult one to
overcome for parlies seeking to invalidate a law, as statutes carry a presumption of
consliiLiiionalily that can only be overcome by “the clearest proof." Flemminu v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603. 617 (1960), ITirihermore, "it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the
legislature is to be pronounced to ha\'c transcended its powers.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 U.S. 87, 128
(1810). The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act {hereinafter “Alaska Statute”) does not
\ iolate the F\ Post Facto Clause because both its stated intent and its effects are non-punitive.
A.

The Ninth Circuit Correctly Held That the Lccislative Intent Behind the Alaska
Statute Was l:xpresslv Non-Puniti\ e and Sur\'ivcs the First Stage of Ex Post Facto
Scrutiny.

The intent behind the Alaska Statute is expressly non-punitive. In determining whether
the legislative intent of a statute is punitive, courts will first examine the text of the statute,
followed by other elements that may contain clues as to its puiTiose such as its classification
within the state codes. Ward. 448 U.S. at 249; Kan, v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
The puipose stated in the text of the Alaska Statute is to “assist in protecting the public safety."
1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41. The express intent of the Alaska legislature in passing the Alaska
Statute \s as unmistakably non-punitive. This conclusion was reinforced by the Court of Appeals
of Alaska, which held that even though the Alaska Statute is classified within Alaska’s Code of
Criminal Procedure, its intent is non-punitive, as the Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure deals
with many other, non-punitive aspeets of the criminal process. Patterson v. Alaska, 985 P.2d
1007, 1012 (Alaska App. 1999). Furthermore, courts have repeatedly stated that the mere
placement of a sex offender registration act in a state's code of criminal procedure “does not
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necessarily indicate an intent on the part of the legislature to punish sex ofFcndcrs.

Cutshall v.

Sundquist. 193 F.3d466, 474 (6th Cir. 1999): see also Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1077 n.
19 (Del. 2001). However, irrespective of the precise location of the Alaska Statute within the
state codes the only language actually indicating legislative intent states that its purj^sc is to
“assist in protecting the public safety.” 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41. The drafters of the Alaska
Statute could hardly have been more e.xplicit in establishing a non-punitive intent. Under any
circumstance, the language chosen by the Alaska Legislature at least denies Respondents the
“conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature” of the Alaska Statute
necessary to invalidate it based on its intent. Mendoza-Martine/, 372 U.S. at 169. Here, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the court in Patterson, and Petitioners do not contest the court’s
conclusion that “the legislative intent of the Act is non-punitive.” Otte, 259 I-.3d at 986.
Therefore, both the language of the Alaska Statute and the case law surrounding it establish its
non-punitive intent, and it passes to the second phase of ex post facto analysis, where only the
clearest proof can overcome its attendant presumption of constitutionality. Flemming, 363 U.S.
at 617. This burden is so great, that even civil confinement statutes, which can effectively
incarcerate sex offenders beyond their sentences for the remainders of their lives, cannot bear the
weight. Sec Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
B.

The Alaska Statute Cannot Be Construed As Punishment Based on its Effects.

In determining whether the effect of a statute is punitive during the second phase of an e\
post facto analysis, this Court traditionally inquires whether a sanction:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
Has historically been regarded as a punishment;
Comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
Operates to promote the traditional aims of punishment;
Applies to behavior that is already a crime;
Could rationally be connected to an alternative, non-punitive purpose; and
Appears excessive in relation to its alternative purpose.
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Mendo7a-Martinc/. 372 U.S. at 168-69. The Court has stated that the seven factors listed in

Mcndo/a-Martinc/ arc “all relevant to the inquiry and may often point in different directions."
Id, at 169. As such, no single factor is dispositive as to a statute's constitutionality, and all must
be w eighed together. ^ Ward. 448 U.S. at 249. The Ninth Circuit held that three of the seven
Mendo/.a-Martine/ factors favor treating the Alaska Statute as non-punitive. Otte, 259 F.3d at
9S9, 991. The Ninth Circuit determined that the effects of the Alaska Statute have not
historically been regarded as punishment, are not triggered only upon a finding of scienter, and
that there is a non-punitive puiposc rationally connected to the statute. Id. A proper balancing
of the seven Mendo/a Martine/ factors reveals little e\idencc, much less the "clearest proof’
required to vitiate the Alaska Legislature’s stated intent to institute a non-punitive measure for
the protection of its cili/ens.

1.

The Alaska Statute's registration and notification requirements do not
impose an affirmative disability or restraint and are not punitive, even
thoiuzh they are triizgered bv behavior that is already a crirne.

The Alaska Statute’s registration requirement does not impose an affirmative disability or
restraint on Respondents. For a statute to impose an affirmative restraint, the sanction imposed
must be severe. 01 Flemmimz. 363 U.S. at 617; Hudson vJJ.S^, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). In
Flemminu, a non-citizen was deprived of certain Social Security benefits as a result of having
been previously deported. 363 U.S. at 605. Citing the "‘infimous punishment’ of
imprisonment" as a counterexample, this Court held that the deprivation of old-age Social
Security benefits did not impose an affinnative disability or restraint on the plaintiff Id at 617
tcitingWong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228 (1896)). In Hudson, the plaintiffs were subjected to
monetary fines and were banned from working in the banking industry because they \'iolated
federal banking laws. 522 U.S. at 104. This Court held that the sanctions involved did not
impose an affirmative disability or restraint “as the temi is traditionally understood." Id, Sex
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offender registration requirements in particular are far less onerous than those imposed in
Hudson. Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474. Here, the requirement that a sex offender appear at one of
the many police stations in Alaska to register is far less se\'ere than the imposition of a fine or
even an occupational debarment. In hict, under the Alaska Statute, registered offenders are “free
to live where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek \\ hatever employment they may
desire." Femedcer v. Haun. 227 F.3d 1244. 1250 (10th Cir. 2000): see also Cutshall. 193 F.3d at
474. Therefore, the registration requirement of the Alaska Statute imposes no affirmative
disability or restraint on Respondents.
The Ninth Circuit erroneously compares the registration requirement of the Alaska
Statute to “onerous conditions” imposed by probation or supervised release. One, 259 F.3d at
9S7. The Alaska Statute bears little if any similarity to the requirements of probation, as it
involves no active supervision, behavioral restrictions, or sanctions for violating such
restrictions. Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1012. Furthermore, a sex offender registered under the
.Maska statute “is not required to submit to a search at the request of a probation or parole
officer, or otherwise comply with the conditions usually attendant on parole release or probation
supervision." M. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s analogy docs not apply, and the lack of any
affirmative disability or restraint imposed by the Alaska Statute becomes more apparent.
The Alaska Statute’s notification provisions impose no affirmative disabilities or
restraints on Respondents. The Ninth Circuit states that community notification over the Internet
is "likely to make the plaintiffs completely unemployable.” Otte, 259 F.3d at 988. However, any
such assertion is purely speculative. The Record contains no evidence to support the contention
that Respondents will be unemployable either in Alaska or abroad because of the notification
provisions of the Alaska Statute. Rather it is Respondents’ own criminal histories, already
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matters of public record, that might (if at all) affect their employability. Any incidents that might
cause Respondents difUculty in employment would not be the consequences of the Alaska
Statute, but rather would be wholly dependent on actions taken by third parties based on the facts
of Respondents' convictions, information publicly a\'ailable prior to the promulgation of the
Alaska Statute. Doc v. Pataki. 120F.3d 1263. 1280 (2dCir. 1997). Furthemiore, the posting of
such information on the Internet still docs not impede Respondents' movements nor prevent
them from choosing to work in u hates er profession they wish.
The activity triggering the Alaska Statute is undeniably a crime. The Alaska Statute is set
in motion by an "aggravated sex offense" or a "child kidnapping.” Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100
(Lexis L. Publg. 2001). This Court has held that when criminal activity triggers a statute, that
consideration can point toward a finding that a .statute is punitive rather than regulatory in nature.
\\';irti. 44S ITS. at 249-50. Notwithstanding, this Court has also refused to put significant
emphasis on this factor, because "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission.” Id at 250 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
399 (193S)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit applied the same logic in
u eighing the constitutionality of a retroactive Megan’s Law, citing the strong connection
between Internet notiHcation and legitimate civil purposes. See Fcmcdcer, 227 F.3d at 1252.
Other courts have followed suit, giving little weight to the fact that retroactive Megan's Laws
apply to behavior that is already criminal. Sec Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1281 (stating that association
of sex offender registration statute with criminal behavior did not “suffice to transform it into
punishment”); CutshalL 193 F.3d at 476 (declining to hold that that a state sex offender
registration statute was transformed from regulatory to punitive even though “the registration and
notification provisions are intertwined with the offender's underlying conviction”). This Court
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should apply the same logic here. Even though the Alaska Statute is triggered by criminal
acti\'ity. it should be accorded only minimal weight because of "the equally strong connection
between notification and legitimate civil purposes,” namely, the protection of the public from
sexual predators. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252-53.
Neither the registration nor the notification provisions ot the Alaska Statute act as an
alfirmaiive disability or restraint upon Respondents, and the fact that criminal acts trigger the
provisions can be of only minimal value to attempts to demonstrate otherwise. Thus, the factors
together show that the Alaska statute is non-punitive. In fact, both the lack of afllrniative
di-sability or restraint, and the minimal weight of Respondents’ criminal acts as triggers for the
Alaska Statute, highlight the absence of precisely that “clearest proof’ of punitive effect
necessary to establish a \ iolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
2.

The Alaska Statute imposes requirements that are not historically regarded
as nunishment and that do not promote its traditional aims.

History does not regard sex offender registration and notification or analogous
requirements as punishment. The historical shaming punishments of the colonial period, such as
banishment, pillory, or requiring the wearing of the proverbial scarlet letter were punishments
because all involved more than the dis.semination of public information. Ft.B. v. Verniero, 119
F.3d 1077, 1099 (3d Cir. 1997). Such colonial practices inflicted punishment “because they
either held the person up before his or her fellow citizens for shaming or physically removed him
or her from the community.” Id, The shaming punishments of the past have been regarded as
such precisely because they “were intended to and did visit society’s wrath directly upon the
offender.” Russell v. Gregoire. 124F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting VCRvJ^onlz, 931
F. Supp. 1199, 1217(D.N.J. 1996)).
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Courts have specifically held that sex offender registration and notification requirements
are quite unlike the scarlet letter of yester>'ear, and they are not analogous to such historical
Nhaming punishments. It is acknowledged that circulating information about criminal activity
has always carried potential negative consequences for those implicated in that activity, but
nc\ crtheless, “dissemination of sucii information in and of itselt. . . has never been regarded as
punishment w hen done in furtherance of a legitimate govemmental interest.

Vemiero. 119 F.3d

at 1099-1100. fart ol'the logic in this reasoning rests in the inherently public nature of the
American legal system. The American criminal justice system necessarily insists on keeping its
proceedings public, and every conviction becomes a matter of public record.

at 1100.

Depending on the crime in\'ol\'ed, and the circumstances surrounding it. a con\iction and its
accompanying proceedings may receive widespread media attention, independent of any
attempts to control publicity. Id, The public nature of the proceedings is all that is needed to
Mibject a convicted defendant to potentially adverse consequences in employment and personal
relationships, regardless of any later dissemination of that information by go\ernment agencies.
Id, What separates sex offender registration and notification from the humiliation punishments
of old is that such negative consequences are not inevitable. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092 {citing
font/. 931 1-. Supp at 1217). Adverse impacts can often be a\oidcd because sex offender
registration and notification requirements do not mandate a direct confrontation between the
offender and members of the public. See Russel], 124 F.3d at 1091.
Sex offender notification is more akin to “wanted" posters and other public advisories
issued by states and the federal government to protect the community than it is to Hawthorne’s
scarlet letter. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092. Such posters and warnings are historically regarded as
non-punitive even though they “disclose essentially the same information [as a statutory
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notification requirement], may rouse public excitement, and may carry a greater risk of
viailantism." Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. The Alaska Statute fits the mold of such government
advisories because it merely “prov ides for the collection and dissemination of information."
which has not historically been considered punishment. CutshaU, 193 F.3d at 475. The Alaska
Statute docs not inflict punishment because it docs not follow the additional steps taken in
colonial shaming punishments to force offenders into embarrassing or humiliating confrontations
with the public such as placing them in the stocks or an iron cage. Moreover, any shame that
might result from the disclosure of sex offender registry information “is certainly not the clearest
proof nccessar>' to overcome the legislative intent that the [statute] serve regulatory and non
punitive punioses.” Id, at 475. The Ninth Circuit's analysis on this point is consistent with that
of the Third and Sixth Circuits in holding that the Alaska Statute is “not analogous to historical
shaming punishments," and therefore non-punitivc on that score. Otte, 259 F.3d at 989.
The Alaska Statute does not promote retribution or deterrence, the traditional aims of
punishment. Retributive statutes affix culpability for prior conduct or seek to punish past
misdeeds. Sec Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. In Hendricks, this Court held that a civil
commitment statute ordering the commitment of various classes of sexual offenders did not
promote the aim of retribution for ex post facto puiposes because it did not “affix culpability lor
prior criminal conduct," but instead used the evidence of prior conduct for non-punitivc
purposes, kf (citing Allen v. 111., 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986)). There, the statute at issue was held
“non-punitive even though it was triggered by a sexual assault.” Id, Such is the case here. The
Alaska Statute does not establish a procedure to affix culpability for prior criminal conduct.
Rather, the Alaska Statute simply uses evidence of prior conduct for a non-punitive purpose,
namely, the legislature’s stated purpose of notifying and protecting the public. Furthermore, the
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retributive sentiments of the public with relation to the conditions imposed by a statute may not
be ascribed to the legislature without evidence. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1283. The record contains no
es idence that vengeful or retributive public sentiment guided the drafting of the Alaska Statute.
As a result, the Alaska Statute cannot be said to promote the aim of retribution.
The Alaska Statute does not promote the aim of detcirence. An individual who is
undeterred from committing a felonious se.\ua! assault or kidnapping, despite the risk of
enduring the w orst of society's criminal penalties such as life imprisonment or even death, w ould
not likely be deterred by potential for additional registration and notification requirements upon
release from prison.' However, even if this Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit and determines
that the Alaska Statute does promote some degree of deterrence, such dctemiination is not
dispositive of whether the Alaska Statute is punitive because deterrence can serve civil as well as
criminal goals. ^ U.S.

Urserv, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996). Any dcteiTcnt effect of the Alaska

Statute is non-punitivc, as it serves the stated legitimate purpose of protecting the public.
Therefore, the Alaska Statute docs not promote cither of the traditional aims of punishment:
retribution and deterrence.

3.

The Alaska Statute does not come into play only on a finding of scienter.

Iix post f acto inquiry further fa\ ors the constitutionality of the Alaska Statute because a
finding of scienter docs not trigger its provisions. Black’s Law' Dictionary defines scienter as
■tlie fact of an act’s having been done know ingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal
punishment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1347 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed.. West 1999). In
Hendricks, this Court held that if the action triggering a civil commitment statute w'ere one that

‘ White a death sentence might be imposed in other states, depending on the crime committed,
Alaska abolished the death penalty in 1957. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State
Death Penalty Information. States Without the Death Penalty
^htip:'/w WAV.deathpenaltyinfo.org/nodp.html> (accessed Oct. 22, 2002).
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required scienter, it would weigh in favor of finding that the statute was punitive. 521 U.S. at
362. The absence of such a requirement is evidence that a statute is not intended to be punitive.

Id In Hudson, this Court elaborated, stressing that a statute tends to be punitive when a
"sanction comes into play ‘only' on a finding of scienter." 522 U.S. at 104. In that case, the
Court upheld monetary penalties and occupational debannenls that were assessed against anyone
who violated certain banking statutes, "without regard to the violator's slate ot mind." Id Thus,
w hen a statute applies regardless of the presence of scienter in the triggering e\ ent. it should be
construed as non-punitive. Such is the case with the Alaska Statute. Scienter is not necessary to
trigger the notification and registration requirements of the Alaska Statute. Rather, the
notification and registration requirements apply to all convicted se.\ offenders in the state,
without regard to the state of mind of the offender. Therefore, the pro\ isions of the Alaska
Statute do not come into play only on a finding of scienter and thus ex post facto analysis tilts
further in favor of finding the registration and notification requirements non-punitive.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the provisions of the Alaska Statute do not come
into play solely on a finding of scienter. However, rather than focusing its scienter analysis on
the provisions of the statute itself, the court incorrectly looked to the requirements of the
underlying offenses in making its determination. Ottc. 259 T.3d at 989. The Ninth Circuit's
proper inquiry into scienter as the trigger for requirements of the Alaska Statute should have
determined “whether the challenged statute contained a scienter requirement on its face, rather
than by looking at the offenses underlying an individual’s classification as a sex offender.”
Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1251 (citing Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104-05). While the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion is the correct one in this case, its examination of the underlying offenses is
inconsistent wdth this Court’s analysis in Hudson and should be corrected to prevent confusion m
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the future. To allow the Ninth Circuit's analysis to remain unchanged as to this Mendoza:
Martinez factor would result in a drastic change to ex post facto jurisprudence. By looking to the
presence of scienter in the underlying oflense rather than the face of the challenged statute itself,
most crimes would have a greater immunity from mechanical or procedural alterations in their
post-cons iction administration. The Ninth Circuit’s scienter analysis unjustly affords greatci ex
post facto protection to convicted murderers, burglars, and even petty thieves than it docs to sex
offenders because the former tlirce classes of criminals commit crimes that require scienter.
Thus, an ex post facto analysis of the elTects of any changes to the post-conviction administration
of their cases would automatically weigh towards being punitive and thus be more likely to
\ iolate the Tx Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Certain sex offenses, however, aie subject
to strict liability, and therefore an ex post facto inquiry using the Ninth Circuit s brand of scienter
analysis would never result in a finding that a challenged statute was punitive based on an
underlying requirement of scienter. Therefore, Petitioners agree with the Ninth Circuit s
conclusion that scienter docs not trigger the provisions of the Alaska Statute, but respectfully
request that this Court uphold the Ninth Circuit's conclusion regarding this point based on the
face of the Alaska Statute rather than the underlying offenses triggering its provisions.

4

The Alaska Statute is rationally connected to the non-punitive purpose of
public safety and is not excessive in relation to that purpose.

Respondents concede, and the Ninth Circuit agrees, that the Alaska Statute is rationally
connected to the non-punitive purpose of public safety. One, 259 F.3d at 991. Statutes are tested
liizhtly on the issue of whether a non-punitive purpose can be attributed to a statute, as all that
need be shown is whether a non-punitive purpose can be ^ rationally connected to the
consequences.’' Fcmedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. The language of the Alaska Statute itself draws the
connection between public safety and its provisions. The Alaska Legislature explicitly stated
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that the “release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general
public will assist in protecting public safety." 1994 Alaska Sess. L. ch. 41.
The Alaska Statute is not excessive in relation to its stated puiposc. In its MendozaMartinez analysis of the effects of the Alaska Statute, the Ninth Circuit found the excessiveness
factor “highly significant” in finding the Alaska Statute to be punitive. Ottc, 259 F.3d at 991.
The Ninth Circuit also makes much of the potential for wide dissemination of the personal
information of registrants under the Alaska Statute. Id. at 992-93. However, the exccssi\ eness
factor cannot be given too much weight in a coun’s ex post facto analysis, as this Court held: “no
one factor should be considered controlling.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101. In Hudson, this Court
stated that such analysis was “ill considered” and “unworkable,” and made a point of overruling
U.S. v. Halocr. 490 U.S. 435 (1989), because it elevated considerations of excessiveness above
all others. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02. The Tenth Circuit applied similar reasoning in
Femcdeer, stating that “a statute is not necessarily excessive for purposes of this [MendozaMarlinezl factor simply because a state has perhaps not achieved a perfect fit between ends and
means.” 227 F.3d at 1253. Furthermore, the court in Femedcer points out that Internet
notification may not result in distribution to a very wide audience, because as the distance from
the state increases, so too does interest in the sex offender database.

The Court should apply

the same logic here. The potential global audience for information on the Alaska website is selllimiting. The further away from Alaska a potential audience is located, the less interest that
audience w'ill have in the information available on the Alaska website. Sec id. Moreover, the
Alaska w'ebsile is passive. Information can only be obtained by Internet users who actively
locate and the access the website. This requires Internet users to lake active measures, such as
contacting the Alaska Department of Public Safety directly or using an Internet search engine to
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obtain the website address. When the requirement of affirmative attempts to locate the Alaska
website is considered together with the decreased interest in its content as distance from Alaska
increases, the likelihood of global dissemination of registrants’ information decreases drastically.
The Alaska website is essentially hidden behind a curtain, and Internet users must actively locate
and pull back that curtain before accessing the information in the registry. Since there is so little
likelihood of anyone outside Alaska peering behind that curtain, the Alaska Statute should not be
found excessive in relation to its stated purjwse. If the Couti does find the Alaska Statute to be
excessive, it is not so excessive that, standing alone, it provides the level of proof necessary to
render it a punitive factor under Mcndoza-Mailincz.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that three of the se\ cn MendozaMartine/ factors point in favor of Petitioners. Of the remaining four factors, none cany'
sufficient weight so as to provide the clearest proof that the Alaska Statute violates the Ex Post
l-acto Clause of the Constitution. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Most of the Mendoza■Martinev factors actually support the presumption of constitutionality of the Alaska Statute under
the Hx Post Facto Clause. Therefore, this Court should find that the Alaska Statute is
constitutional and grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioner.
C.

Public Policy Supports the Reeistration and Notification Requirements of the
Alaska Statute.

All states have sex ofTendcr registration and notification statutes, and Megan’s Law has
its ow n independent registration requirement. The prevalence of these statutes and their
ON'crwhelming support by the courts demonstrates a strong public policy favoring the use of
registration and notification statutes in general. Alaska is a state that has a particular need for an
effective sex offender registration statute such as the one already in place. Alaska is the largest
of the United States in area. Alaska is sparsely populated, and its population density is the
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lowest of any of the fifty states. Alaska’s population also includes a disproportionately high
number of sex offenders. Taken together, these facts demonstrate that where most states can
achieve adequate notification by posting flyers or by mail, it would be too slow, too costly, and
too ineffective to use the same methods in Alaska, where the need for notification is greater.
Notification via the Internet affords Alaska residents, many of whom live in isolated and remote
areas, the same level of notice that they would receive in other, more densely populated states
that use traditional methods.
II.

CONNECTICUT’S SEX OFEENDER REGISTRATION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE BECAUSE ONLY TRUE; PUBLIC
INfORMATION IS PUBLISHED AND NO TANGIBLE LEGAL INTEREST IS
TERMINATED.
A state may not deprive a person of liberty or property without due process of law. U.S.

Const, amend. XIV. Under 42 U.S.C.

1983. such a deprivation of procedural rights may be

vindicated in court. Procedural due process questions begin with an examination of whether a
recognized liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State. Kv. Bd. of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Protected liberty interests may derive from
cither the Due Process Clause itself or the laws of the States, [d I lowever, the range of interests
protected by procedural due process is not without limitation, jd.
This Court has set forth a two-part inquiry, the “stigma plus” lest, for determining if a
liberty interest exists in one’s reputation and whether it is deserving of due process guarantees.
Paul

V.

Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). As a threshold issue. Respondents must show that

government action imposed a loss of reputation, or “stigma,” upon them under color of law. Id.
at 696-97. Generally, this type of injury only gives rise to a standard claim of defamation,
actionable in any state court. Paul. 424 U.S. at 697. Defamation alone, even if inflicted by state
officials, does not result in a deprivation of a protected liberty interest and is not actionable under
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42U.S.C.§ 1983. PaaL424 U.S.at7l2. Under the second step of the analysis. Respondents
must further demonstrate a “plus" factor by show ing that the government action complained of.
"distinctly altered or extinguished" a right or status previously protected under state law. Id. at
711. Without an implication of some more tangible interest, or “plus” factor, such a claim fails
to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause. Id at 701. Here, the
Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act neither falsely stigmatizes Respondents nor
extinguishes their legal rights. Therefore, Respondents' claim fails both parts of the "stigma
plus" te.st. and there is no Due Process Clause violation.
A.

There Is No False Stiema Created bv the Publication of True Information in
Coniunction With an Express Disclaimer.

Connecticut's sex offender registry' only disseminates true information about registrants,
lor a go\*ernmental action to infringe upon the “reputation, honor, or integrity of a person, it
must invoh’c the publication of information that is substantially and materially false. Codd v.
Wbjcr, 429 U.S. 624, 627-29 (1977). Considering the nature of the interest at stake, the absence
of any factual dispute as to the substantial truth of the material in question, destroys any claim
for procedural due process. Id. at 627. In Codd, the Court held that even if the plaintiff w'as
indeed stigmatized by government action, the fact that the information was substantially true
precluded any due process claim. Id at 628-29. The gravamen of a stigmatization due process
claim is that a hearing should be afforded “solely to clear one’s name.” Id Thus, where the
published information is truthful, no hearing can achieve such a result, and accordingly, no
hearing is due. id
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1.

No defamation results from the publication of accurate public record
information about Respondents* past criminal convictions.

The publication of true information in a sex offender registry, while potentially damaging
to one's reputation, is not defamatory. Helman. 784 A.2d at 1071. In Helman. a convicted sex
offender subject to Delaware's registration and community notification law sought to invoke the
Delaware Constitution’s express protection afforded to an individual's reputation. Id, at 107071. The Delaware Supreme Court recognized the constitutionally grounded protection against
defamation, but held that no defamation had occurred. Id, The information published by the
Stale was truthful and public, identifying the registrant by name, address and crime. Id, at 1071.
Therefore, the notification was not defamatory, even if damaging. Id, The court concluded that
stale-directed disclosure of information arising from criminal prosecutions did not constitute an
infringement of a protected interest. Id
It is widely recognized that the social consequences that flow from a criminal conviction
are considerable. U.S. v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994). aff'd in part, re\''d in nart on
other izrounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Virtually all individuals who are convicted of serious crimes
suffer humiliation and shame, and many may be ostracized by their communities. M, However,
such reputational injuries are not consequences imposed by sex offender registry publication.
Doe

V.

Pataki, 120F.3d 1263, 1280 (2d Cir. 1997). Most information contained in the registrx'

was available prior to the enactment of such registration statutes, id Rather, the effects of
public notification result essentially from a registrant's underlying criminal conviction. Id
Any injury to reputation caused by sex offender notification flows most directly from the
offender's own misconduct, i.e. the underlying conviction. Lanni v. Enuler. 994 F. Supp. 849.
855 (E.D. Mich. 1998). In Lanni. registrants under Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act
claimed, inter alia, that the act’s notification provisions were defamatory and violated their
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procedural due process rights. Lanni. 994 F. Supp at 855. However, the court found that any ill
elTecis to reputation were only tangentially related to state conduct. Id. The court reasoned that
because the registration act merely compiled and disseminated truthful, public information, any
iiijur\ to reputation resulted directly from the criminal conviction and private citizens’ reaction
thereto. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the registrants were not entitled to due process
protection from the disclosure of true information. Id.
Respondents do not contend that any information contained in the registry is false or
olherw ise inaccurate, including their underlying sex offense convictions. As in Helman and
Lanni. the registry's publication only makes available truthful, public information such as name,
address and crime. As a matter of law, the di.sclosure of information arising from Respondents*
criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and not defamator>'. Cf Helman. 784 A.2d at
1071. Indeed, in the case at bar this point is true, a fortiori, because unlike in Helman. there is no
express constitutional protection for Respondents’ reputation. Moreover, any injur>’ to reputation
How s directly from Respondents' prior convictions, not the subsequent dissemination of that
information.

Lanni. 994 F. Supp. at 849.
2.

The Connecticut registry’s express disclaimer specifically negates any
defamatory inference.

Any defamatory implication must be present in the plain and natural meaning of the
words used. Chapin v. Kniuht-Ridder. Inc.. 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993). Because the
constitution provides “sanctuary for truth,” Respondents must make an “especially rigorous”
showing of the implied defamation where the facts are literally true. Id at 1093. The language
must not only be reasonably read to impart the false inference, but it must also affirmatively
show that the author intends the defamatory inference. Chapin. 993 F.2d at 1093 (citing White v.
Fraternal Order of Police. 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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Respondents admit the registry's truth, but contend it implies a false defamatory
inference. That is. Respondents assert that community notification stigmatizes them as cuiTenily
dangerous sex offenders. However, the online registry makes no statement that any particular
registrant is currently dangerous. In fact, the front page of the registry’s website contains a
disclaimer, stating that the Department of Public Safety “has made no determination that any
individual included in this Rcgistr\' is currently dangerous," and that “[i]ndividiials included
w ithin the registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law." (J.A.
31.) The disclaimer goes on to infonn the viewer that the "main purjiosc" of the website is “to
make the information more easily available . .. and not to warn about any specific individual."
31.)
The Second Circuit coirectly recognized that Respondents' contention that publication of
the registry implied, as a matter of law, that every person listed was a currently dangerous sex
offender was highly dubious. Doe v. Conn. Dept, of Pub. Safety, 271 l■.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2001).
After all. the registry is nothing more than a list of “«// offenders con\’ictcd of the covered
crimes." Id. The undifferentiated nature of the registry simply does not imply that any particular
indi\ idual is cuiTcntly dangerous, and the disclaimer enforces this notion. Id.
Any claim of defamation by implication must be capable of being proven false. Here, the
rcgistr>' makes no implied assertion that can be pro\ cn false. Whether a particular registrant will
commit a future offense is unknown and unpro\ ablc, and the registry explicitly denies making
such an assertion in its disclaimer. See Vemiero. ll9F.3dat 1108 (citing studies that concluded
generally that mental health professionals were not capable of predicting future dangerousness).
In addition, despite the Second Circuit’s deduction that the general legislative intent of the
Connecticut Statute forces a defamatory implication, the disclaimer specifically states that the
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intent of the online registry is to facilitate access to public information. The registr>'’s stated
purpose simply does not support any inferential suggestions regarding dangerousness.

B.

The Provisions of the Connecticut Statute Do Not Implicate Any Tangible
Interests That Constitute a Plus Factor under Paul v. Davis.

F.ven where stigmatization has occuiTcd. this Court has repeatedly emphasized that no
constitutional doctrine e.xists to transform every dcTimation by a state actor into a deprivation of
a liberty interest. Paul. 424 U.S. at 702. I hider the reasoning of Paul, there exists only a narrow
hand of tangible interests sufficient to trigger due process protections. Id. at 711. A line ot this
C’ourt's decisions has funily established that such “plus" factors are only present where “as a
result of the state action complained of. a right or status previously recognized by state law was
distinctly altered or exlingiii.shed." Id.
Despite the damaging effect of the “stigma" w hich may result from government
defamation, “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment,” is
neither liberty nor properly w orthy of due process protection. Id. at 701. The government's
jiLiblic designation of indi\ iduals w ith stigmatizing labels “does not directly deprive anyone of
liberty or property." .loint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm, v. McGrath. 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951).
The stigma of government branding docs not in itself destroy any legal right or immunity. Id. at
1 S3-84. Any such claim of injury relates to sanctions applied by public disapproval, not by law.
Iji The Paul Court recognized that in McGrath, a majority of the Justices had rejected the notion
that a government imposed "stigma" could invoke due process guarantees without a direct effect
on a legal status. Paul. 424 U.S. at 704-05.
This Court has repeatedly reinforced this line of reasoning. ^ e^ Wieman v,
I’pdeeraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (refusing to pass on procedural due process claim where state
workers were stigmatized as “disloyal”); Cafeteria Workers v. McElrov. 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (no
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due process violation where government discharge bestowed a badge of infamy but without an
attendant foreclosure of other employment). Most recently, in Sieueil v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226
(1991), this Court again reiterated the teachings of Paul. Although the case was resolved on
qualified immunity grounds, the Court re-emphasized that the plaintiff could not state a due
process claim without showing that the stigma resulted in a something more than an
“impair[ment]” of future employment prospects, kl at 234. So long as the damage sustained
flows from an injury to reputation, it may be recoverable under state toil law. but is not
reco\ erablc in a constitutional action. Id.
1.

The registration provision cannot establish a plus factor because it is not
the state action uiviim rise to the alleged stiuma.

Under Paul, this Court held that the requisite plus factor must arise "as a result of the
state action complained of" Paul. 424 U.S. at 711. Stated another way, the injury to reputation
and the loss of a tangible interest must originate from the same governmental act. See id. In the
case at bar, the stigmatizing governmental action complained of is the Connecticut Act's public
notification provisions. Respondents argue that the Connecticut Act’s public notification
provisions impliedly stigmatize them, harming their interest in reputation. Yet, they do not
contend that the notification provisions establish a plus factor. Rather, Respondents allege the
registration provisions satisfy the plus requirement. Accordingly, their claim must fail because
the public notification elements of the Connecticut Statute are the only portions that can trigger
due process protection under Paul.
The Paul Court clarified this causal principle in its analysis of Wisconsin v.
Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), which had stated that due process guarantees come
into play where “a good person’s name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him.” The Court of Appeals misinterpreted this phrase to mean that
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go\ emment defamation, without more, could invoke due process protection. Paul. 424 U.S. at
"OS. This Court rejected that reading, noting that such an interpretation would result in a
signillcant broadening of its previous holdings. Id Rather, the linchpin of Constantineau lay in
the fact that a deprivation resulted "because of what the government is doing to him.” Id This
relerred to the fact that the go\ ernment action taken, i.e. public notification, deprived the
indi\ idual of a right previously held under state law. Id In Constantineau. it was the posting of
defamatory llyers that caused the reputational injury, and it was the posting that altered the
jdaintiffs pre\ iously protected status. Id
The Paul Court buttressed this conclusion \ ia an analysis of its decision in Bd. of Reecnts
\ . Roth. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth recognized that govcmmental defamation in the course of
denying a person continuing employment, could entitle them to due process of law. Paul. 424
I '.S. at 709. Howexer, in that case, the stale did not impose upon the plaintiff a “stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id
(quoting Roth. 408 U.S. at 573). Thus, the defamation had to occur in the course of the
termination of employment, and had to result in a foreclosure of the ability to secure future
emplo> inent. Id at 710.
The Second Circuit incorrectly concluded that the Connecticut Statute's registration
requirement could be considered as a plus factor. This Court’s precedent demonstrates that the
loss of a tangible interest and the injury to reputation must originate from the same governmental
act. The relationship between the duty to register and the harm caused by any possible
defamation is simply too attenuated. While it is true that registration process provides some of
the disseminated information, it is the notification that allegedly causes the injury to reputation.
Thus, the notification must also be the act that causes a deprivation of some other right. As the
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Paul Court stressed with respect to its interpretations of Constantineau and Roth, a plus factor is
implicated only where a tangible legal interest is extinguished “as a result of’ what the
government is doing to him. The registration provision is not the govenimental action
complained of, as required under Paul. Accordingly. Respondents' claim fails to satisfy the plus
factor clement.

2.

Neither the notification nor reeistration provisions of the Connecticut
Statute rise to the level of depri\ation sufllcient to imnlicate due process
concerns.

Community notification of sex offender registry information does not impose any burden
that docs not flow from a sullied reputation. Publicly designating convicted sex offenders as
such, does not “depri\e them of any legal right or immunity.” See McGrath, 341 U.S. 123. 18183 (1951). Publication of the registry does not subject sex offenders to legal prosecution,
punishment, or by operation of law prohibit them from carrying on any activities. See id.
Although registrants’ information is subject to widespread notification, “they are nevertheless
free to li\ c where they choose, come and go as they please, and seek whatever employment they
may desire.” Fcmcdecr, 227 F.3d at 1250 (holding that Utah’s sex offender notification law did
not work an affirmative disability on registrants). The consequences which fiow from the
registry’s dissemination flow directly from public opinion in response to the taint of criminal
conviction. This is mere defamation, which the Court has never held to be sufficient absent an
accompanying loss of rights. Paul. 424 U.S. at 706.
The Connecticut Act’s registration provisions also do not extinguish any legal right or
status sufficient to constitute a plus factor. A registrant is still “free to live where he chooses,
come and go as he pleases, and seek any employment he wishes.” Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 474.
The duty to register is a collateral consequence of conviction, not a restraint on liberty.
Williamson v. Greeoire. 151 F.3d 1180, 1184(9thCir. 1998). Rather, the registration provisions
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ac{ merely as cis il regulation, akin to the loss of the right to vote, own firearms, or possess a
professional license - each of which is beyond the scope of due process considerations, but are
far more onerous than a simple duty to register. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183. Indeed, the
burden of registration is far less harsh than a loss of profession or benefits. Artwav v. Attv.
(ieneral of N.J.. 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3dCir. 1996). Registration is a mere regulatory obligation,
w hich takes it out of due process concerns. See Williamson. 151 F.3d at 1184; Russell. 124F.3d
at 1092 (holding that se.\ offender registration requirements are regulatory’ or remedial).
At its core, the instant case is similar to the situation in Paul. In Paul, the plainlilTsought
constitutional protection from the consequences of slate disclosure of his an'est and law
enforcement's assessment that he was a continuing risk. 424 U.S. at 695-98. So too.
Respondents .seek constitutional protection from the consequences of disclosure of their
com actions and the state's judgment that they pose continuing risks. See V^emiero. 119 F.3d at
1103. It follows that like the plaintiff in Paul. Respondents ai'e not entitled to due process
pr otection for an injuiy' to reputation. Yet. here. Respondents’ call for procedural protection is
e\ en less justifiable.
In Paul, the plaintiff's shoplifting arrest was made by store security -not even police- and
he w as newer prosecuted on the siioplifting charge. 424 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Local law enforcement then made an informal decision to brand him as an “active shoplifter”
w ithout a coLii’t's determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 718. Indeed, Justice Brennan’s
dis.sent in Paul is fundamentally an attack on the possibility that the government might judge an
individual guilty of a criminal offense without properly convincing a factfinder of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 724-25. According to Justice Brennan, an interest in
reputation has conci'cte protection via the presumption of innocence given in the criminal justice
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system. Paul, 424 U.S. at 724. Such constitutional safeguards exist to prevent condemnation of
an individual when there is doubt as to his guilt. Id. Here, sex offender registrants have been
Judged guilty in a court of law. The presumption of their innocence is gone. Respondents are
subject to registration and notification requirements per the Legislature’s directive: on the basis
of their conviction.
3.

The Second Circuit’s definition of a plus factor is overbroad and inimical
to values of federalism.

This Court has emphatically denied the proposition that a state law claim could be
transmuted into a constitutional action, simply because a state actor inflicted a wrong “under
color of law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 699. To embrace such a line of rea.soning would be an affront to
the \ alues of federalism. Id. at 698-99. The aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment against the
conduct of stale officials is not unlimited, for it does not alter the basic relations betw een the
state and federal governments. Id. at 700. Justice Douglas made this point clear when he bluntly
stated that “the fact that [a person] is assaulted, injured or even murdered by state officials, docs
not necessarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution.”
Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 108-09 (1945). The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be understood
to make all torts of state ofTicials into federal claims. Id at 109. The mere indication of unique
government involvement under color of law' is not enough to show the presence of a plus factor.
Such a reading contravenes this Court’s teachings and would serve to make the Fourteenth
Amendment “a font” of federal tort law to be superimposed upon the states. Paul. 424 U.S. at
701.
In the case at bar, the Second Circuit’s holding amounts to a significant broadening of the
language in Paul, in its definition of a plus factor sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause.
Here, the Court of Appeals disaggregated the plus factor as defined by Paul, requiring only a
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concurrent temporal link between the defamator\' statement and an action “governmental in
nature.” Doe. 271 F.3d at 56. Thus, according to the Second Circuit, all Respondents must do to
establish a plus factor is “point to an indicium of material government involvement unique to the
government's public role.” Id. Supposedly, this distinction serves to differentiate Respondents'
claim from a traditional state-law defamation action. Id. However, this “distinction” is
subsumed in the very' definition of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 focuses on
the misuse of power made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed in government
authority. U.S. w Classic. 313 U.S. 299. 326 (1941). Thus, such a claim will always entail some
"indicium" of government involvement. The Second Circuit’s reasoning severs the relationship
between the go\ernmcnt action that causes the harm, and any resulting deprivation of rights.
1 nder the Second Circuit’s definition, even the plaintitTin Paul could establish a plus factor.
M‘t. as this Court held, there was no plus factor present in that case. Thus, the Second Circuit's
plus factor test is overbroad and incongruent w ith this Court's decision in Paul.
The Second Circuit also erred by resting its holding on a flaw’cd interpretation of Parrat \.
Ta\ lor. 45 I U.S. 527 (1981), ovcmilcd in nart on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986); sec Doc, 271 F.3d at 55. In Parrat, this Court held that no due process violation
oecLirrcd where state prison officials negligently deprived an inmate of his property rights. 451
U.S. at 541-44. The Coui1 echoed the holding of Paul, stating that to permit constitutional suits
based on random or unauthorized state action under color of law would turn the Fourteenth
Amendment into a font of federal tort law'. Parrat. 451 U.S. at 544. The holding in Parrat is
consonant with Paul, but it does not equate to an expansion of the definition of the plus factor.
Parrat does not stand for the proposition that only random and unauthorized state actions are
barred from due process suits.
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Similarly, the Second Circuit's reliance on Sieeert, is also unfounded. S^ Doe. 271 F.3d
at 54-55. The Court in Siegert held that even a malicious defamation resulting in an impairment
of future employment prospects did not establish the presence of a plus factor. 500 U.S. at 234.
Siegert demands, as does every § 1983 action, some non-trivial state im olvement that removes
the plaintiff's complaint from the realm of state tort law. Id. at 233. However, the case did not
turn on this point, but rather on the fact that the alleged defamation was not made incident to the
termination of the plaintiffs employment, id. at 234. Again, the Court's holding in Siegen is
consistent with Paul, but it does not imply that the presence of some non-trivial, non-arbitrary
go\ ernment action is determinative of a plus factor’s existence. Indeed, the holding of that case
further weakens the Second Circuit’s proposition that the government action that extinguishes a
legal right can somehow be independent from the defamatory act.
C.

Compelling Public Policy Interests Justify Connecticut's Sex Offender
Registration Act Provisions.

Protecting our communities from victimi/ation at the hands of sex offenders is a problem
of grave seriousness for all .states. It is undeniable that a strong slate interest exists in
implementing programs that will alleviate such a threat and promote public safety. As the rape
and murder of Megan Kanka demonstrates, sex offenders released back into the community must
be taken into account in any stale’s public safety initiatives. The federal and state governments
have looked to compulsory registration and notification measures for convicted sex offenders as
a way to aid law enforcement and the public in general in preventing further sex crime tragedies.
All fifty states and the federal government have promulgated sex offender registration and
notification laws. The overwhelming legislative support for such measures evinces the
compelling state interest in their continued implementation. The courts’ support for registration
and notification statutes further shows a strong public policy favoring their use. Sec
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Doe v.

I\)rit7. 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (the state has a substantial and compelling interest in
public disclosure of sex offender registries, which outweighs pri\ acy rights). The weighty
considerations of public safety amply justif>' the Connecticut Act's registration and notification
pro\ isions.

With these public safety concerns in mind, it is not unreasonable for convicted sex
offenders to have a diminished expectation of due process rights. Once society makes a valid
determination of guilt, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly. Ford v. Wainw riaht.
477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Convicted sex
olTenders have been judged guilty. remo\ ing the presumption of innocence, which influences any
determination of procedural unfairness. Logan, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1167, 1217
(1999). Indeed, this Court's decisions establish that “there is no continuum of due process rights
l equiring \'arying lc\ els of process at every stage in the criminal system.” Ohio Adult Parole
■Authority v. Woodard. 523 U.S. 272, 283 (1998). On the basis of their convictions for sex
offenses. Respondents should have a lower expectation of due process rights with respect to
registration and notification.
Respondents elaim that notification leads to harsh results, including threats, ostracism,
harassment, and vigilantism. The courts have recognized that notification may well subject
offenders to humiliation, public opprobrium, ostracism, and the loss of job opportunities. E.g.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092. However, the potential ostracism and opprobrium that may result
from notification is not inevitable, as it was with the person whipped, pilloried or branded in
public. Id The courts have also emphasized that an inquiry into the law's effects cannot
consider the possible "vigilante" or illegal responses of citizens to notification. Id Such action
is expressly discouraged in the notification itself and will be prosecuted by the state. (J.A. 31.)
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Indeed, courts must presume that law enforcement will obey the law and will piotect otfenders

from vigilantism. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092.
On the basis of these significant policy considerations, this Court should not act to
prevent the state from disseminating truthful and potentially life-saving information to its
citizens. To do so would work against the already difncult task of protecting our communities
from dangerous sexual predators.
CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Ninth and Second Circuits are out of step with this Court s decisions
on both ex post facto and due process issues, as both circuits misapplied the juridical principles
established by this Court's precedent. The Ninth Circuit erred in construing Alaska's Sex
Offender Registration Act as a violation of constitutional safeguards against ex post facto law s,
despite its non-punitive, regulatory intent and effect. The Second Circuit also erroneously
concluded that Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registration Act deprives registrants of due process
rights, even though it neither falsely stigmatizes them nor terminates any tangible interest as
defined by this Court. In light of the strong public policies favoring these statutes as tools tor
promoting public safety. Petitioners respectfully urge this Court to RLV LRSL the Judgments ot
the Ninth and Second Circuits.
Dated: October 29, 2002
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